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Abstract. This paper presents a preliminary study of the issues on the way of 
developing an automated mediation agent. The work is conducted within the 
‘curious negotiator’ framework. The work look from a knowledge perspective 
at mediation is an information revelation process. The introduced formalism is 
used to demonstrate how through the revealing of the appropriate information 
and changing the understanding of the disputes mediation can succeed. 
Automating mediation needs to take in account that mediation is a knowledge 
intensive process, where the mediators utilise their past experiences and 
information from negotiating parties for changing the positions of negotiating 
parties.  
Keywords: automated mediation, mediation agent, information-based agency 
1 Introduction 
Negotiation is the process whereby two (or more) individual agents with conflicting 
interests interact, aiming at reaching a mutually beneficial agreement on a set of 
issues. Engaging in such interactions is a daily activity – from a simple negotiation of 
the price of a product we buy at the market to the complicated negotiations in dispute 
resolutions on the international arena. Whatever is the level of negotiation, during 
such interactions, participants may need to make concessions in order to reach an 
agreement [1].  
Negotiation is goal-directed in the sense that individual agents involved in a 
negotiation may—probably will—have agendas of their own. But the agendas of the 
negotiating agents may be incompatible—there may be no solution that satisfies them 
all. Further the existence of a solution is unlikely to be known when the negotiation 
commences [2]. So it may not be useful to consider negotiation as a search problem 
because the solution space may be empty whilst the negotiating agents may believe 
that it is not so. If the negotiation is a multi-issue negotiation for which the issue set is 
open [i.e. it can change at any stage in the negotiation] then the agendas of the 
individual negotiating agents must necessarily be at a higher level than the issues 
because the issues are unknown, and may even be issues that ‘had never occurred’ to 
one of the agents. So for multi-issue negotiation the agendas of the agents can not in 
general be an even high level goal such as ‘to maximise profit on the deal’ as the deal 
space is unknown. Environmental conflict resolution is a typical example, where 
conflicts involve many different types of parties, issues and resources [3].  
As a result negotiations may reach a deadlock, taking prohibitively long time 
without reaching tangible outcomes, or be terminated. This is when in real life the 
intervention of a mediator can influence the process, facilitating it towards a mutual 
agreement. 
The design of the ‘curious negotiator’ automated negotiation system, outlined 
initially in [4], is an attempt to address these issues. Fig. 1 shows an updated version 
of the overall design proposed in [4] and the progress of the work.  
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Fig. 1. The design of the ‘curious negotiator’ and the progress of the research 
The ‘curious negotiator’ is founded on the intuition “it’s what you know that 
matters” and investigates the use of information and information theory, including 
entropy-based (random worlds) inference, as a foundation for automated negotiation 
between agents with bounded rationality. The design presented in [4] aimed at 
exploiting the interplay between contextual information [5] and the development of 
offers in negotiation conducted in an electronic environment. This contextual 
information is derived from what happens at the bargaining table and away from it. 
The work on the negotiation agent (shaded area A in Fig. 1) focused on identifying 
mechanisms and knowledge structures for utilisation information in the negotiation 
process. Negotiation agent   negotiates with agent 

 by sending illocutions which 
represent offers and counter offers. The illocutions are represented in communication 
language ℂ . An example of such language, where the kernel set of negotiation 
illocutions is extended with illocutions that enable persuasive negotiation and 
argumentation, is presented in [6] and [7]. Negotiation agent   also uses an internal 
language ℑ  for it’s reasoning. 
Negotiation agent   negotiates from a stance that assumes nothing about her 
opponent’s motivations and applies maximum entropy logic to that which it has 
observed. The basic feasibility of this approach was reported in [8] where an agent for 
multi-issue bilateral bargaining signs contracts if it is sufficiently confident that they 
are acceptable. This work is orthogonal to the utility-based approach, and treats 
negotiation as an information discovery and revelation process. The output from the 
work covering the shaded area A in Fig. 1 is known collectively as information-based 
agency [7]. 
The information that the agent utilises may come from at least two sources:  
a. from the ‘negotiation table’, e.g. from the counter offers that the opponent 
provides (this is incorporated in the work presented in [8]) [in general, all utterances 
agents make during a negotiation give away (valuable) information]; 
b. from external sources, e.g. other deals, news, companies white papers, blogs of 
virtual communities, and other electronically accessible sources, all of which 
constitute part of the context in which negotiation happens.  
The automation of the discovery, representation and delivery of the necessary 
information and knowledge to the agents has been the focus of the work on the 
information discovery and delivery system in the ‘curious negotiator’ (shaded area B 
in Fig. 1). Elements of the approach and different technical aspects of the embedded 
information mining system have been presented in several works. In [9] it has been 
presented one of its components in more details - an effective automated technique for 
extracting relevant articles from news web sites and their semi-structured 
representation, so that they can be used further by the information discovery and 
delivery system. In [10] it has been demonstrated how extracted unstructured or semi-
structured news can be utilised to refine exchange rate predictions and provide the 
information to the negotiating agent. The choice of the application has been 
influenced by the literature indicators that daily economy news and political events 
influence the exchange rate daily movement [11, 12]. The mechanism includes news 
extraction algorithms, a quantitative process model based on the extracted news 
information, which is exemplified by an exchange rate prediction model, and a 
communication protocol between the data mining agents and negotiation agents. The 
predictive information about the exchange rate then can be utilised by agent’s 
negotiation strategies. The system complements and services the information-based 
architecture in [7, 8]. The information request and the information delivery format is 
defined by the negotiation agent in the query. For example, if the topic of negotiation 
is buying a large number of digital cameras for an organisation, the shared ontology 
will include the product model of the camera, and some characteristics, like “product 
reputation” (which on their own can be a list of parameters), that are usually derived 
from additional sources (for example, from different opinions in a professional 
community of photographers or digital artists). Information request can be formulated 
in a form that depends on the knowledge representation used by the agent, e.g. sets of 
possible values, value ranges, probability values. For example, if the negotiator is 
interested in high resolution cameras, and the brand is a negotiation parameter, the 
request for information to the information mining and delivery system can be 
formulated as a set of consisting of camera models and corresponding requests for 
preference estimates. These preference estimates then can be computed from the 
information about these models, available in various sources, including various 
communities of professional experts, prosumers and consumers. In [13] is presented a 
recommender mechanism that utilises text mining to extract opinions about the 
products from consumer reviews available in electronic from and convert those 
opinions into a recommendation that then can be utilised by a negotiation agent.  
When the mechanisms for providing information and reasoning with such 
information, as well as the respective knowledge representation structures, have been 
developed, the mechanisms for dealing with negotiations that fail in reaching an 
agreement, or seemed to be leading to a failure, remain the undeveloped part of the 
‘curious negotiator’ - the unshaded part in Fig. 1 includes the mediating agent   , the 
observer agent  and their supporting knowledge representation structures.  
The paper presents an extremely preliminary work on the principles of building 
automated mediation agent within the ‘curious negotiator’ framework, consistent with 
the approach of the information based agency. It explores mediation as information 
revelation process. It specifies the requirements towards the knowledge representation 
structures supporting mediation, including case-based representation for storing the 
experience of past negotiations. Section 2 looks at mediation, as a knowledge-driven 
process and explores the changes that information revelation can make to the 
negotiation space and the outcomes of negotiation. It introduces the notion of ‘mental 
model’ of participants involved in the process and looks at mechanisms of how these  
model can be utilised in automated mediation. Section 3 considers some aspects in 
utilising past experiences and background knowledge in automated mediation. It 
looks also at the utilisation of information at the diagnosis stage. 
2 Mediation as a knowledge driven process of information 
revelation.  
Contemporary analysts in social and political sciences look at mediation as a process 
that enables conflict resolution. Mediators are often indispensable in the area of 
dispute (or conflict) resolutions, settling variety of disputes, spanning from conflicts 
between sovereign nations to conflicts between family members, friends, and 
colleagues. Successful mediation can make a dramatic difference to the outcome of a 
negotiation stalemate. For instance, on 14 January 1998 the President of United 
Nations Security Council issues statement demanding “that Iraq cooperate fully and 
immediately and without conditions with the Special Commission in accordance with 
the relevant resolutions.”1 As all UN weapons inspections in Iraq were frozen, during 
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the following month all direct negotiations between the US and Iraq did not reach any 
agreement and the military conflict seemed unavoidable. The following event 
sequence illustrates the mediation process: (i) the US authorised the mediation effort; 
(ii) the UN secretary (the mediator) achieved a possible deal with Iraq; (iii) the UN 
secretary passed it back to the US; (iv) the US reviewed and accepted the deal. 
Several months later the conflict escalated, but this time no mediation was sought and 
military actions started. The mediation made a huge difference in the first dispute 
resolution.  
2.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for mediation 
This example illustrates that mediation as a process involves information 
revelation and part of mediator’s strategy is guiding the process of information 
revelation. The following are the necessary (C1, C2) and sufficient (C3) conditions 
for a mediation to take place: 
Condition C1: Negotiating agents   and 

 are willing to achieve a mutually 
beneficial agreement; 
Condition C2: Negotiating agents   and 

 are seeking or will accept mediation (in 
the first case, the awareness about the conflict and the problem with the current state 
of the negotiation resides with the negotiating agents, in the second case either the 
mediator agent    or, if present, the observer agent  diagnoses the problem; 
Condition C3: A mediating agent    is available (this condition is by default 
embedded in the ‘curious negotiator’ paradigm).  
In the example with the 1998 Iraq crisis, in the second case condition C2 was not 
present. Conflicts may be a result of a contradiction of interests, as in the example 
with the 1998 Iraqi crisis, but can be also a result just of a different (but unknown to 
the disputing parties) perception of the disputed subject.  
2.2 Mediation process within the ‘curious negotiator’ framework 
Further we consider the following mediation process, illustrated in Fig. 2, where 
agents   and 

 are in a deadlock and direct exchange of offers between them has 
ceased. In a mediation session,   and 

 interact with messages m only with the 
mediating agent   .  
( ) ( )M t•  denotes a “mental model” at time t. We use the label “mental model” to 
denote the view (including related knowledge) of an agent about a dispute, about the 
views of the other parties on that dispute and the expected outcomes. This knowledge 
is internal to the agent. Each model is manifested to the other agents through the 
actions taken by the agent. Further in the text we use the term mental model without 
quotation marks.  
( )M tα  and ( )M tβ  denote the mental models of agents   and  , respectively. 
( )M tα  is not known by   and ( )M tβ  is not known by  . None of them is known by 
the mediating agent   . Each of these agents has own approximations of the mental 
models of the other agents. ( ) ( )agent partyM t  denotes the mental model that the agent has 
about another party. In particular, ( ) ( )M tα β  is the mental model of   about 

, i.e. 
about what 

 wants out of the negotiation; respectively, ( ) ( )M tβ α  is the mental model 
of 

 about  , i.e. the position of   in the dispute. Further, ( ) ( )M tµ α  and ( ) ( )M tµ β  are 
the mental models of the mediating agent    about the positions of   and 

 in the 
dispute, respectively. The actual formalism that expresses these models is beyond the 
scope of the paper. 
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Fig. 2. The mediation agent within the ‘curious negotiator’ framework 
2.3 Mediation process within the ‘curious negotiator’ framework 
We use the above formalism to demonstrate some aspects of mediation that need to 
be taken in account when developing automated mediators. In the Orange Dispute 
[14], two sisters want the same orange. According to Kolodner [14] “MEDIATOR 
assumes they both want to eat it and solves the problem by having one sister cut the 
orange in two and the second chooses her half. When the second sister uses her peel 
for baking and throws away the pulp, MEDIATOR realises it made a mistake.” 
[MEDIATOR [15] is one of the early case-based mediators. The focus of the work 
was on the use of case-based reasoning for problem understanding, solution 
generation, and failure recovery. The failure recovery ability is demonstrated with the 
Orange Dispute in [14]]. 
Further we present the two mediation attempts in terms of the agreements reached 
and the information that can be passed to the mediator. Lets our agent   represents the 
first sister who wants to have the orange as a desert and agent 

 represents the second 
sister who wants to have (only the peel of) the orange for cooking (the recipe requires 
the whole peel). If our mediation agent    happen to be the case-based MEDIATOR, 
then the situation described in the Orange Dispute can be expressed through the 
mental models of the individual participants in Fig. 3, making explicit the wrong 
assumption (the shaded area in Fig. 3). 
 
( ) : '  wants the orange as a desert'M tα α=  
( ) : '  wants only the peel of the orange for cooking'M tβ β=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants an orange'breakM tα β β=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants an orange'breakM tβ α α=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants the orange as a desert'startM tµ α α=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants the orange as a desert'startM tµ β α=  
Fig. 3. The wrong initial assumption of the MEDIATOR [15] in terms of our mental models. 
This initial assumption (which didn’t change as there were no mechanisms for that) caused the 
failure of that mediator. 
In these models tbreak, and tstart indicate the time when negotiation broke and when 
mediation started, respectively (in the case of the MEDIATOR it has been a one step 
act). The results of the agreements in terms of the outcomes - Outcome (agent, issue, 
result) are presented in Table 1, where result values are denoted as follows: “+”, “+/–
” and “–” for a positive, acceptable, and negative results, respectively for the 
corresponding agents in terms of negotiated issue. In the original example [14], the 
result in the outcome for 

 should be “+/–” as the second sister still used the peel from 
her half. Here we added the constraint of the recipe in order to get negotiation about 
the orange to a halt with an unacceptable “–” result and generate a request for 
mediation.  
Table 1. Outcomes of the Orange Dispute, based on mediation with initial assumption 
Agent Agreement clauses Outcome for    Outcome for 

 
   
Cuts the orange into halves Outcome( , have orange, +/–) Outcome( , have orange, –) 

 
Chooses one half Outcome( , have orange, +/–) Outcome( , have orange, –) 
 
The Orange Dispute can be considered an example of a dispute over resource 
scarcity. The resource in this case has a possible component-based separation 
(without change of the total amount of available resource) that allows to change the 
structure of the dispute through mediation, opening the space for a mutually beneficial 
solution. It exposes two aspects of mediation: 
- The difference that a mediator can bring is in exploring the structure of the 
problem from a broader stance.  
- An initial assumption by a mediator can lead to a failure of the mediation 
effort; 
Consequently, we formulate the following postulates for the automated mediator: 
Postulate P1: An automated mediator    should start interaction with extracting 
more information about the position of the parties on the negotiation.  
Postulate P2: An automated mediator should develop an independent “grand view” 
of the problem, which is more comprehensive than the individual views of   and 

, 
respectively.  
Postulate P3: An automated mediator    should operate from the initial stance only 
of conditions C1 and C2.  
Starting mediation without initial assumptions means that    either does not have a 
model for each of the negotiating agents   and 

, or accepts the models ( ) ( )M tα β  and 
( ) ( )M tβ α  these agents have about each other at the point of requesting mediation. In 
the case of the Orange Dispute,    starts mediation with the exit models of   and 

:  
- ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ):start breakM t M tµ α α β= , i.e. ( ) ( ) : '  wants an orange'startM tµ α α= , and 
- ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ):start breakM t M tµ β β α= , i.e. ( ) ( ) : '  wants an orange'startM tµ β β= . 
This information is not sufficient for mediation, e.g. the uncertainty in the mutual 
models of   and 

, and the model    has are the same. Research in conflict resolution 
in international relations demonstrates that if a mediator could credibly add 
information to the system of negotiators this alters the state of the system [16]. 
Consequently,    takes steps in order to decrease this uncertainty. In addition, 
intuitively, it seems worth checking whether both parties have the same understanding 
of the issues in the dispute, i.e. technically, whether they operate with the same 
ontology or with compatible ontologies. In the Orange Dispute,    obtains from each 
party what the orange is needed for. The Orange Dispute in terms of the mental 
models of the individual participants in the case of proposed mediation agent is 
presented in Fig. 4. In these models tbreak, tstart and tend indicate the time when 
negotiation broke and when mediation started and ended, respectively. Note the 
difference of ( ) ( )startM tµ •  for both   and 

 in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. The steps taken by the 
mediating agent are described in Fig. 5 (we do not use a formal illocution based 
language, but the actions that the language should cater for are shown in italic).  
 
( ) : '  wants the orange as a desert'M tα α=  
( ) : '  wants only the peel of the orange for cooking'M tβ β=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants an orange'breakM tα β β=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants an orange'breakM tβ α α=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants an orange'startM tµ α α=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants an orange'startM tµ β α=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants the orange as a desert'endM tµ α α=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants only the peel of the orange for cooking'endM tµ β α=  
Fig. 4. The respective mental models of  , 

 and  in the mediation session of the Orange 
Dispute with our proposed agent 
The Orange Dispute illustrates also another important ability that an automated 
mediator should posses – the ability to refocus or restructure the dispute, based on the 
additional information about the models of each party. The outcomes of the 
restructured Orange Dispute are shown in Table 2 
The ability to restructure the problem is crucial for developing successful 
automated mediators. The Sinai Peninsula Dispute in the area of international 
relations shows similar properties to the Orange Dispute. The Sinai Peninsula is a 
piece of land of about 62,000 square km that separates Israel and Egypt. With its 
landscape Sinai has a military value for either side in terms of mechanised infantry 
transport or as a shelter for guerrilla forces. The perceived importance of the territory 
is evidenced that Israelis and Egyptians fought in or over the Sinai Peninsula in 1948, 
1956, 1967, 1968-1970, and 1973. Since 1967 Sinai had been occupied by Israel. Fig. 
6 shows a very simplified version of the models of the parties at the initial meeting in 
Jerusalem, when the negotiations started and halted and the change of the mediators 
models that lead to the outcomes. For the purpose of this paper we aim to emphasise 
the high level analogy with the Orange Dispute case (see Fig. 4), i.e. the need for a 
mediator to reframe the problem. In fact, the need for restructuring the problem in 
order for a mediator to get a “bigger picture” has been recognised in PERSUADER 
[1], to resolve labor-management disputes. In recent works [17] the mediator is 
expected to have a complete knowledge of the solution space. 
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  : ask  to send its ontology of the negotiated item [orange]. 
  : ask 

 to send its ontology of the negotiated item [orange]. 
  : compare ontologies received from  and 

. 
  : send  and 

 agreed ontology [orange as a fruit which has pulp and 
peel]. 
  : ask  to send    its preferences on the negotiated item in terms of 
agreed ontology. 
  : ask 

 to send    its preferences on the negotiated item in terms of the 
ontology. 
  : advises  and 

 on ( )M tα  and ( )M tβ  based on their preferences 
  : checks the case base for past cases [resource disputes] 
  : retrieves resource disputes with divisible components 
  : sends  and 

 action “separate resource” [peel the orange] 
  : tells  and 

 to complete negotiation. 
  : mediation completed. 
Fig. 5. Mediation as information revelation aiming at decreasing uncertainty within the 
negotiation system 
Table 2. Outcomes of the restructured Orange Dispute 
Agent Agreement clauses Outcome for   Outcome for   

  
Peels the orange Outcome(, eat, +) Outcome( , cook, +) 
  
Gets the whole peel Outcome(, eat, +) Outcome( , cook, +) 
 
Following the initial interaction in Jerusalem, the US President Jimmy Carter 
initiated a third-party mediation effort that culminated in the Camp David accords. 
For the purposes of this paper we consider a simplified version of the second 
agreement of the Camp David accords on the future of the Sinai Peninsula. The items 
in the agreement are presented in Table 3, in a structure, similar to the presentation of 
the agreements in the Orange Dispute in Table 1 and Table 2. Without getting into the 
details of the mediation steps, from Table 3 it is evidenced that the initial mutually 
perceived models ( ) ( )M tα β  and ( ) ( )M tβ α  about the need for territory and strategic 
military advantage have been transformed by the mediation into a 
Security/Sovereignty trade-off, with economic benefits.  
 
( ) : '  wants security, support for economy, recognition'M tα α=  
( ) : '  wants sovereignty (restored territory), support for economy, security)'M tβ β=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants territory and strategic military advantage'breakM tα β β=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants territory and strategic military advantage'breakM tβ α α=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants territory and strategic military advantage'startM tµ α α=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants territory and strategic military advantage'startM tµ β β=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants security, support for economy, recognition'endM tµ α α=  
( ) ( ) : '  wants sovereignty (restored territory), support for economy, security'endM tµ β β=
 
Fig. 6. The respective mental models of  ,  and  in the mediation session of the Sinai Dispute 
with our proposed agent 
Table 3. The Sinai Peninsula Dispute.  denotes Israel;  denotes Egypt 
Party Agreement clauses Outcome for  Outcome for   
 
Withdraw its armed 
forces from the Sinai 
Outcome(, Military, –)  Outcome( , Territory, +) 
Outcome( , Sovereignty, +) 
 
Evacuate its 4500 
civilians 
Outcome(, Territory, –)  Outcome(, Territory, +) 
Outcome( , Sovereignty, +) 
 
Restore Sinai to Egypt Outcome(, Territory, –) Outcome(, Territory, +) 
Outcome( , Sovereignty, +) 
 
Limit its forces within 3 
km from Egyptian border 
Outcome(, Military, –) 
Outcome(, Security, +) 
Outcome(, Security, +) 
 
Lost the Abu-Rudeis oil 
fields in Western Sinai 
Outcome(, Economy, –) Outcome(, Economy, +) 
 Normal diplomatic 
relations with Israel 
Outcome(, Recognition, +) Outcome(, Security, +) 
 Guarantees freedom of 
passage through Suez 
Canal  
Outcome(, Economy, +) 
Outcome(, Security, +) 
Outcome(, Security, +) 
 Guarantees freedom of 
passage through nearby 
waterways  
Outcome(, Economy, +) 
Outcome(, Security, +) 
Outcome(, Economy, +) 
Outcome(, Security, +) 
 Restricted Egyptian 
forces in Sinai  
Outcome(, Security, +) Outcome(, Military, –) 
Outcome(, Security, +) 
 
The analogy with the Orange Dispute is in having the initial negotiation framed 
around a common resource Territory and a similar issue of having strategic military 
advantage as the main goals that can enable the security. Though both territorial and 
military components remain on the negotiation table, the mediator brought a 
background knowledge which changed the models of the parties: security and 
restoration may not necessarily be achieved with occupation of a territory or with 
expensive military presence. 
The information injected by the mediator and proposed steps leads to decreasing the 
differences between perceived mental models ( ) ( )M tα β  and ( ) ( )M tβ α , and the 
respective actual mental models ( )M tβ  and ( )M tα  agents   and , respectively, i.e. 
the intervention of the mediator decreases the uncertainty in the negotiation system. 
2.4 Operating with information in mediation 
As the mediator utilises information to decrease the uncertainty in the dispute, an 
automated mediation would require a measure of uncertainty ( ) ( )( )H M t• , allowing 
to quantify and compare the uncertainty coming from the incomplete knowledge of 
the mental models of the agents. In terms of the two party mediation in Fig. 2, this 
decrease of uncertainty in mental models should be observable, i.e. 
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )H M t H M tµ α β α<  and ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )H M t H M tµ β α β< . Within the 
framework of the information-based agency, which adapts information-theoretic 
approach, such measure should measure the “information gain”, as the mediator adds 
such gain. 
Viewing mediation as a dialogue system in Fig. 2, e.g. the mediator is engaged 
with a dialogue with each party, points also to the information-theoretic work in 
dialogue management strategies in conversational case-based reasoning [18]. In terms 
of an automated mediation system, the mediator should have the mechanism to 
determine the most informative question to ask at each stage of the interaction with 
each of the negotiating agents.  
3 Utilising past experiences and background knowledge in 
automated mediation 
The American Bar Association defines mediation as a process by which those who 
have a dispute, misunderstanding or conflict come together and, with the assistance of 
a trained neutral mediator, resolve the issues and problems in a way that meets the 
needs and interests of both parties.2 This definition emphasises the key role of the past 
experience of the mediator and its unbiased nature. Further, we consider these two 
aspects, starting with mediator bias. 
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3.1 Unbiased mediator 
The bias of a mediator is defined as the presence of a preference towards one of 
the 
• outcomes in the negotiation; 
• sides involved in the negotiation. 
Not having preference towards any of the outcomes of a negotiation means also to 
keep open all options. For instance, the peace-loving broker’s bias towards peaceful 
solutions makes his or her claims less believable compared to a broker who is 
indifferent to war or peace [16]. Such bias as a result can decrease the effectiveness of 
the mediation effort. Protecting automated mediation from introduction of a bias is 
not seen as a problem. 
3.2 Utilising past experiences 
Experience is, perhaps, the distinct feature between successful and less successful 
mediators. Case-based reasoning (CBR) is an approach to problem solving that 
emphasizes the role of prior experience during future problem solving (i.e., new 
problems are solved by reusing and if necessary adapting the solutions to similar 
problems that were solved in the past) [see [19] for a recent review of the state-of-the-
art in the CBR field]. From a machine learning point of view, updating the case base 
is a lazy learning approach (i.e. learning without generalisation). Some aspects of 
using the past experience by the tandem Mediation and Observation agents has been 
discussed in [4]. In terms of required case representation, a starting point is 
knowledge representation structure for representing negotiation cases, proposed in 
[20]. This structure needs to be updated for dealing with ontologies. For the 
mediation, the case based will be linked to the corresponding knowledge base of the 
mediation strategies used. The case structure now includes a negotiation case as its 
problem section and the collection of mediation steps, information used and other 
knowledge, as the solution part of the case.  
Important from a computational perspective is the diagnosis stage of the mediation 
process [21]. The diagnostic function consists of monitoring the progress of 
negotiation or related interactions intended to settle or resolve disputed issues 
[Druckman and co-authors [21] refer to [22]]. Monitoring provides a long view of 
unfolding developments, including trends in escalating and de-escalating dynamics. 
Within the framework of ‘curious negotiator’ we consider this stage as a pre-
mediation stage, which is executed by the observer agent  . To some extent it 
resembles similarity with OLAP3 – the pre-data mining steps in business intelligence, 
where summary statistics at different levels are generated and later provide guidance 
to the data mining strategies. Similar to OLAP, monitoring should be able to provide 
snapshots of the negotiation process at any moment of time at different levels of 
granularity. The mediator  should be able to estimate the difference between 
( ) ( )M tα β  and ( ) ( )M tβ α  from the respective actual mental models ( )M tβ  and ( )M tα  
                                                          
3
 Online analytical processing. 
in order to define the intervention time of mediating interventions [if we follow a 
proactive approach and intervene before negotiation fails]. 
Conclusions 
Though there has been some interest in automated mediation [1, 15, 17, 23] during the 
years, the field requires a significant effort in research and development. This paper 
has presented an early work on the principles of building automated mediation agent. 
The mediation agent is part of the ‘curious negotiator’ framework, hence can utilise 
some of the machinery developed for it, in particular:  
• the information-based agency [7, 21], which offers mechanisms that allow 
the interplay between argumentation and information; 
• the information-mining system, [9, 10], which offer means for automated 
discovery and (to some extent) delivery of that information to negotiating 
agents; 
• the electronic/virtual institutions environment [24, 25], which offers means 
not only for performing negotiation, but also for collecting the necessary 
data about the negotiation sessions in order to use it in mediation.  
Mediation is an information revelation process. The Orange and Sinai disputes 
demonstrate how through the revealing of the appropriate information and changing 
the understanding of the disputes mediation can succeed. Computationally, the 
approach requires the specification of the introduced mental models of the agents and 
the definition of a measure of the difference between what is labelled as mental 
models. The aim of the mediation is to decrease the difference between what is a 
perceived model and the actual model. One possible way is by identifying alternative 
formulations of the dispute, demonstrated with the Orange dispute and Sinai dispute 
(the simplified version of the second agreement).  
Case-based reasoning offers potential mechanism for the mediator for handling 
past experiences, though the structure of the case will be complex (in comparison to 
the usually assumed attribute-value structure), extending the already complex 
structure for representing negotiation cases [20]. Overall, from a knowledge 
perspective, automating mediation needs to take in account that mediation is: 
- a knowledge intensive process, where the mediators utilise their past experiences; 
- a process that utilises information from negotiating parties and uses information 
for changing the positions these parties have on the negotiation table. 
As it may deal with confidential information, mediation requires trust in the 
mediator from the parties involved, as much of the information about their position 
negotiating parties would not reveal to the other side. Though this has been beyond 
the scope of the paper, we are aware of this issue. 
In conclusion, we would like to stress that the importance of mediation has been 
recognised world-wide. It’s interesting to note that nowadays mediation skills are 
taught to students at various levels and schools spanning from elementary schools to 
university schools, including the Harvard Law School. Hence, the development of an 
automated mediation system is on the top priority of the research agendas. 
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